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Despite decades of research, buffer overflows still rank among the
most dangerous vulnerabilities in unsafe languages such as C and
C++. Compared to other memory corruption vulnerabilities, buffer
overflows are both common and typically easy to exploit. Yet, they
have proven so challenging to detect in real-world programs that
existing solutions either yield very poor performance, or introduce
incompatibilities with the C/C++ language standard.
We present Delta Pointers, a new solution for buffer overflow
detection based on efficient pointer tagging. By carefully altering
the pointer representation, without violating language specifica-
tions, Delta Pointers use existing hardware features to detect both
contiguous and non-contiguous overflows on dereferences, without
a single check incurring extra branch or memory access operations.
By focusing on buffer overflows rather than other vulnerabilities
(e.g., underflows), Delta Pointers offer a unique checkless design
to provide high performance while still maintaining compatibility.
We show that Delta Pointers are effective in detecting arbitrary
buffer overflows and, at 35% overhead on SPEC, offer much better
performance than competing solutions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Almost 30 years after the Morris Worm famously used a buffer over-
flow bug in fingerd, such vulnerabilities are still rife in modern
C/C++ binaries. Ever since, researchers have searched for ways to
automatically detect and prevent the triggering of buffer overflows.
Unfortunately, existing solutions suffer from either unacceptable
overheads or poor compatibility. In this paper, we add an interest-
ing new point in the design space to detect both contiguous and
non-contiguous buffer overflows, with less overhead than compa-
rable solutions (35% performance overhead on SPEC CPU2006 and
negligible memory overhead).
Aiming for a practical defense against the most prevalent attacks,
we limit our focus to buffer overflow vulnerabilities whereby at-
tackers can overwrite memory after the end of the buffer, rather
than underflow vulnerabilities which are far less common [28]1.
On the other hand, since non-contiguous overflows are now more
common than contiguous overflows in real-world exploits [29],
simply surrounding all buffers with so-called red zones (as used by
AddressSanitizer [37] among others) no longer suffices, since doing
so prevents only contiguous ones. Instead, we strive for a solution
that prevents all types of overflow and works łout of the boxž on
programs written in standard C code, simply by recompiling the
code with a specific compiler flag.
Bounds checking is one of the oldest and most common defenses
against buffer overflows. By recording the bounds of an object with
each pointer, defenses can insert run-time checks to verify that
the pointer still falls in the valid range upon dereference. Sadly,
bounds checking is still costly due to metadata management, but
especially because of the checks. Reading the bounds data from
memory, verifying the validity of the pointer, and optionally branch-
ing if the pointer is temporarily out of bounds or missing metadata
due to uninstrumented code all incur significant overhead. As a
consequence, researchers during the past three decades have fo-
cused on improving both the performance of such systems and their
compatibility with the standard. Although the solutions have sig-
nificantly improved over time, state-of-the-art systems still suffer
from compatibility issues and non-practical overheads. For example,
the fastest contiguous and non-contiguous buffer overflow detector
today, Low-Fat Pointers [12], still incurs over 50% performance
overhead (SPEC CPU2006) and yet cannot automatically support
arbitrary off-by-one pointers allowed by the C/C++ standard and
required by many real-world programs [7].
To address these issues, we propose Delta Pointers, a new ap-
proach to detect buffer overflows. The Delta Pointers design is dif-
ferent from all existing approaches in that it implicitly invalidates
1Anecdotally, although labels in the CVE database are not very precise, buffer overflows
outnumber underflows by almost two orders of magnitude in such database: https:
//cve.mitre.org/
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pointers upon going out of bounds (providing good performance)
and revalidates them when going back in-bounds (providing good
compatibility). Specifically, we show that our solution is signifi-
cantly faster than existing solutions while providing compatibility
with the C standard (and we discuss remaining compatibility issues
in detail). We ensure that any dereference of an invalid pointer
leads to an automatic crash enforced by the hardwareÐsimilar to
how a dereference of a kernel pointer in user space leads to a crash.
As a result, Delta Pointers eliminate any need for additional memory
accesses or branches, pushing the overflow check to the hardware
and making pointer dereferences very efficient.
Intuitively, we utilize pointer tagging and ensure that any arith-
metic on the pointer that makes it point beyond the buffer’s upper
bound, will result in setting the most significant bit in the 64 bit
address, while any arithmetic that makes it point below the up-
per bound, will unset this bit. Prior to a dereference, we mask out
all other bits of the tag. If the most significant bit is not set, the
pointer is valid, but a dereference of a pointer where this bit is
set will immediately crash the application because such addresses
are non-canonical, triggering a fault in the processor’s memory
management unit.
Our approach makes minimal assumptions and is portable across
64-bit architectures. It works with existing hardware and most
C/C++ programs out of the box (and we elaborate on possible is-
sues in later sections). While pointer tagging itself provides good
compatibility, we outline some challenges faced by practical im-
plementations which have not been detailed by previous pointer
tagging-based solutions [25, 26].
To summarize, our contributions are:
• A novel, fully automated, design to detect buffer overflows
based on pointer tags that automatically invalidates out-of-
bounds pointers.
• An analysis of the practicality of pointer tagging for arbitrary
C/C++ applications.
• An LLVM-based prototype of our design, evaluated with
respect to effectiveness and performance. Our results show
that Delta Pointers can detect the dominant class of spatial
memory error vulnerabilities with competitive compatibil-
ity and overheads (35% slowdown on SPEC and negligible
memory overhead).
2 BACKGROUND
In C and C++, a programmer can allocate a buffer object, which is
a sequence of bytes somewhere in the address space. For instance,
variables on the stack are implicitly allocated on function entry and
a programmer can use malloc or new to explicitly allocate a buffer
object on the heap. These objects are referenced through pointers,
which point to the memory location of an object, or a location
therein. The C standard [21] specifies that pointer arithmetic only
produces defined behavior if the resulting pointer points inside
the same object or at the element directly past its end. In practice,
compilers produce invalid out-of-bounds pointers without warning.
Without any security measures, such pointers can be used to access
any object in the address space, regardless of which buffer the
original pointer pointed to.
For example, a call such as ptr = malloc(16) allocates a new
object on the heap and returns a pointer to its beginning. An offset
of exactly 16 would yield a pointer to the end of the object, which
is valid but results in undefined behavior upon dereference. Any
dereference of an index smaller than 0 (e.g., ptr[-10]) is an un-
derflow, and any dereference of index 16 or larger is an overflow.
It is common for programs to (benignly) create pointers pointing
outside the referent object [7]. However, if malicious users can lure
the program into dereferencing such pointers as a result of a buffer
overflow vulnerability, they may be able to leak or corrupt sensitive
information, for instance to divert control flow.
Overflow detection. To detect buffer overflows during the execu-
tion, existing spatial memory safety defenses insert run-time checks
in programs. Such instrumentation consists of one or more checks,
in the form of branches, on either pointer dereferences [11, 12, 18,
26, 31, 34, 37] or pointer arithmetic (e.g., ptr2 = &ptr[offset]) [1,
23, 38]. Moreover, the metadata describing object bounds must be
recorded, propagated and retrieved numerous times, often from
memory [18, 23, 26, 31, 34, 37, 38]. Given the many extra branches
and memory accesses required, the run-time checks can introduce
significant runtime overhead.
As a result, the reduction of the number of branches and (espe-
cially) memory accesses has been the motivation for most prior
research in spatial memory safety. Early defenses stored all their
metadata in memory, for instance recording the base and size for
every object in the program [23]. More recent defenses limit such
in-memory metadata to only pointers that reside in memory [31]
or to only the lower bounds of objects [26]. Alternative designs
avoid storing metadata in memory altogether by manipulating the
memory layout to implicitly encode the size and base of the object
in the address of its memory location [1, 11, 12].
The need for (expensive) branching has also been a target of opti-
mizations. Traditional spatial safety defenses require two branches:
one for the lower bound and one for the upper bound of an ob-
ject [31]. More recent defenses have suggested reducing pointer
validation to a single branch by enforcing predictable (but wasteful)
power-of-two alignment on allocated objects [1]. Besides pointer
validation, existing defenses also require additional branches for
compatibility with common real-world scenarios, such as branch-
ing on temporarily out-of-bounds pointers [1, 6, 38] and branching
on uninstrumented pointers with NULL metadata (e.g., in the case
of uninstrumented shared libraries) [26, 31].
In this paper, we focus on the most common class of spatial safety
errors (buffer overflows) and investigate whether minimizing the
number of extra branches and memory accesses (and the overhead)
to detect overflows is possible. We start our analysis with a simple
adaptation of state-of-the-art solutions. Specifically, we developed
an adaptation of SGXBounds [26] that only stores the upper bound
of an object in the high bits of its base pointer and uses a (branching)
check on each memory access to compare the two parts of the
pointer and detect (only) overflows. This design eliminates extra
memory accesses, but still requires branching (for both pointer
validation and support of uninstrumented modules) and incurs
48% (SPEC) overhead in our experiments. With Delta Pointers, we
present a new design that can eliminate extra branches and memory
accesses altogether, while retaining the same security guarantees
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Figure 1: The encoding of Delta Pointers (tagged pointers). It
points to an object on the heap of 24 bytes. The delta tag en-
codes the distance from the current pointer to the end of the
object. The value of the delta tag is calculated as −distance
(here −24, in two’s complement). The most significant bit is
only set if the pointer is out-of-bounds.
and incurring only 35% (SPEC) overhead. In other words, removing
the branches reduces the overhead by roughly 25%.
3 THREAT MODEL
We consider an attacker able to exploit a buffer overflow by feeding
malicious inputs to a given vulnerable user program. We assume
the attacker can repeatedly interact with the program, and the pro-
gram is automatically restarted in case of crashes caused by failed
exploitation attempts. Our goal is to detect user-space exploitation
of arbitrary buffer overflows when memory is either written to of
read from, protecting both integrity and confidentiality.
4 DELTA POINTERS
Delta Pointers eliminate the need for branching checks by encoding
the out-of-bounds state of a pointer in the pointer itself. Rather than
relying on expensive instrumentation, we use hardware memory
protection mechanisms to implicitly invalidate pointers that go out-
of-bounds, and revalidate themwhen they go back in-bounds. Upon
dereference, out-of-bounds pointers automatically trigger a fault.
This is possible by encoding, in every pointer, a tag that describes
the distance to the end of the memory object. This scheme aims
to translate the buffer overflow detection problem into an arith-
metic overflow detection problem, which can be dealt with more
efficiently thanks to (i) detection offloaded to the hardware, (ii) ef-
ficient load/store and pointer arithmetic instrumentation with no
branching or memory accessing instructions, (iii) no extra branches
required to support common compatibility features, such as tem-
porarily out-of-bounds pointers and uninstrumented pointers.
The absence of memory accessing instructions and out-of-band
in-memory metadata provides two additional benefits other than
good performance. First, the lack of in-memory metadata ensures
a compact memory footprint (Delta Pointers introduce negligi-
ble memory overhead). Second, using only in-pointer metadata
eliminates any need for synchronization across threads for meta-
data management, ensuring scalability and thread-safety in multi-
threaded applications.
Pointer encoding. To enable our design, we make use of pointer
tagging both to implement implicit out-of-bounds pointer invalida-
tion and to ease propagation of metadata inside and across contexts.
Specifically, each pointer is tagged with the current distance from
the pointer to the end of the object, called the delta tag, and an
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Figure 2: Examples of how the metadata inside a pointer is
updated during pointer arithmetic: every operation on the
address (lower bits) is also performed on the tag (higher bits).
The most significant bit, indicating whether the pointer is
out-of-bounds, is implicitly set and unset during these oper-
ations.
overflow bit. As the distance from the current pointer to the end
of the object changes during pointer arithmetic, the delta tag is
kept consistently up to date. The overflow bit indicates whether the
pointer is out-of-bounds, and is implicitly set during delta tag up-
dates. To facilitate the implicit management of the overflow bit, the
delta tag is encoded as the negated remaining distance, as we will
explain later. Figure 1 illustrates our encoding scheme: the upper-
most bit is the overflow bit, followed by the delta tag. This encoding
allows for 32-bit tags, limiting addresses to 32 bits similar to prior
tag-based schemes [26]. However, in contrast to prior schemes, in
our design this division of bits can be changed arbitrarily depending
on the application; the address space need not be limited to 32 bits.
Instead, it allows a trade-off between the maximum object size and
the address space size: as one increases, the other decreases, both
by a factor of two.
The key insight exploited by our encoding scheme is that, by
updating the delta tag alongside the pointer itself (which can be
done efficiently), the state of the overflow bit is managed implicitly.
Figure 2 shows the state of the bits during several operations on the
pointer. The allocation on the first line creates a new pointer and
initializes the delta tag to −object_size . When adding an offset to
the pointer, the addition is replicated on the delta tag, as shown on
the second line. On the third line we do the same, this time causing
the pointer to go out-of-bounds: the accumulated offset added to
the delta tag is equal to the encoded object size. The pointer now
points to the end of the object and the distance towards the end is
0. The carry bit of the addition on the delta tag sets the overflow
bit implicitly. The fourth line shows that the same mechanism can
bring a pointer back in bounds. When we subtract 1 from the entire
upper part of the pointer (the delta tag and the overflow bit), it
returns to the same state as in the second line.
Whenever the program dereferences a pointer, we first apply a
bitwise AND operation to mask out the delta tag and create the
regular untagged pointer the CPU expects. By maintaining the
overflown state of a pointer in its upper bit we eliminate the need
for an explicit (branching) check when dereferencing the pointer.
Instead, we leave this bit intact by not masking it out with the
delta tag as illustrated in Figure 3. Through this approach, we
delegate the check to the memory management unit (MMU) of
the processor: a pointer can only be used if it is in a canonical
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02 0c 40 100 7f ff ff e8
ff ff ff ff1 00 00 00 00
Pointer:
Mask:
02 0c 40 280 00 00 00 00
&
Figure 3: Before using the pointer to accessmemory,wehave
tomask out themetadata to create a valid pointer. By using a
bitmask with the most significant bit, we keep the overflow
bit of the pointer intact. If the pointer was overflown, and
thus had its overflow bit set, this bit will still be set in the
resulting pointer. This is an invalid (non-canonical) pointer,
causing a run-time error.
form, where the 16 most significant bits are sign-extended [20].
For pointers in user space, this equates to 16 zero bits, since the
upper bit of an 48-bit pointer is reserved for kernel space in most
operating systems. A set overflow bit therefore makes the pointer
uncanonical, causing the MMU to generate a fault. The underlying
assumption is that bitwise masking operations, combined with
arithmetic operations on pointer additions, are highly optimized
on a microarchitectural level, and are therefore faster than explicit
checks with branches. Even though on modern architectures the
branch predictor is heavily optimized, branches still incur overhead.
Listing 1 shows the translation of these two concepts into code
instrumentation. 1○ creates the delta tag in the correct format and
places it in the upper bits of the pointer. At 2○ we replicate the
addition that happened in the lower bits to the upper bits. Finally, 3○
performs masking, leaving the pointer and the overflow bit intact.
Because the delta tag is part of the pointer itself, it is automatically
propagated across contexts, and will not result in any memory
accesses. Moreover, 2○ and the pointer arithmetic can be combined
to a single operation: nptr = ptr + (user_input + (user_input <<
32)), even down in the output assembly.
NULL pointer protection. The NULL pointer constitutes a special
case of a pointer that is not derived from any object, but still pro-
vides an (often neglected) attack surface for spatial errors. Exploits
for such bugs typically add an attacker-controlled offset with the
value of the target location to grant the attacker arbitrary memory
read or write capabilities [24]. For Delta Pointers, we set a delta
of 1 on all NULL pointers, thus replacing them with a value of
0x7fffffff00000000. This will cause any dereference of a pointer
derived from NULL to trigger a fault and hence detection.
Thread safety. Delta Pointers are inherently safe with respect to
racy pointers. Added instrumentation on memory operations and
pointer arithmetic consists of arithmetic operations that operate on
registers, and no additional memory accesses are introduced. Modi-
fied pointers are written to memory in a single atomic operation (on
most architectures), causing the pointer tag to always be consistent
with its corresponding address. An existing race condition may be
influenced by the introduction of additional operations on either
end, but this is an inherent problem of racy pointers, not a race
condition introduced by Delta Pointers.
void *foo(int user_input) {
char *ptr = malloc (16);
delta_tag = (1 << 31) - 16; 1○
ptr |= delta_tag << 32;
char *nptr = &ptr[user_input ];
nptr += (uintptr_t)user_input << 32; 2○
tmp = nptr & 0x80000000ffffffff; 3○
*tmp = 'a';
}
Listing 1: C program instrumented with Delta Pointers. In-
strumentation is shown as pseudocode on the highlighted
lines. 1○ sets the delta tag, 2○ updates the delta tag alongside
the pointer, and 3○ strips out the metadata (but not the over-
flow bit) before a memory access.
Address space reduction. Since pointer tagging-based defenses
use part of a pointer to encode metadata, they reduce the amount of
bits left for addresses. Because this limits the addressable virtual ad-
dress space, ASLR entropy is reduced as well. For instance, Low-Fat
pointers [11] reserves a large virtual memory region for each object
size class, and SGXBounds [26] encodes two 32-bit addresses side
by side in each pointer, thus not fully utilizing the 36 bits of entropy
offered by SGX. Delta Pointers similarly limit addresses to 32 bits
by default (but configurable on a per-application basis). Although
ASLR has a wider scope than these schemes (e.g., use-after-free
bugs), it can only provide probabilistic safety at best, whereas Delta
Pointers provide deterministic (spatial) memory safety guarantees
on the upper bound. Because of its probabilistic nature, ASLR has
proven to be easily circumventable by memory massaging [16, 33]
or side channels [5, 15, 17] whereas this is not possible for deter-
ministic defenses such as Delta Pointers. Moreover, the impact of
address space reduction is limited in certain application domains.
As an example, similarly to SGXBounds, Delta Pointers are well
suited to run arbitrary programs in SGX enclaves, which only sup-
port 36-bit addresses currently. By encoding metadata in pointers
rather than in memory, the only memory overhead of Delta Point-
ers is that of added code (which is negligible), even amounting to
an advantage over, for example, shadow memory-based schemes in
SGX where virtual memory is limited.
Our Delta Pointers prototype uses 32 bits to address a 4 GB
address space. The remaining 31-bit delta tag allows for a maxi-
mum allocation size of 2 GB. This split is configurable and can be
tweaked depending on the application: a program that allocates
a lot of smaller objects can have a bigger address space. For in-
stance, without any address space reduction, an application would
have 47 bits of address space and 16-bit delta tags, allowing for
only 64 KB objects. For Delta Pointers we did all evaluation with
32-bit addresses and 31-bit delta tags because our experimentation
shows this achieves a good compatibility with a large set of complex
real-world programs under realistic workloads.
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5 POINTER TAGGING
Delta Pointers are an instance of pointer tagging to efficiently store
metadata per pointer, yielding a design that has low overhead for
lookups, negligible memory overhead and automatically works
with concurrent programs. These benefits do not come for free:
modifying the representation of pointer introduces various chal-
lenges regarding compatibility and performance. These challenges
are not limited to Delta Pointers, but are generic in nature and must
be dealt with by any defense that encodes metadata in pointers.
In this section, we discuss the challenges that need to be ad-
dressed by pointer tagging based approaches, with the aim of in-
spiring and assisting future research based on this increasingly
popular technique. We also present the solutions to the listed prob-
lems which are implemented in Delta Pointers, showing that high
compatibility with complex real-world applications is possible in
the presence of tagged pointers. We discuss four challenges with
pointer tagging. First, adding arbitrary metadata in pointers re-
quires careful implementation of pointer operations to conform
to the C standard and implicit assumptions of C programs on its
implementation. Second, compilers make certain transformations
that make pointer identification harder, in particular during op-
timizations. Third, defenses must deal with pointers that do not
have metadata due to optimizations or uninstrumented libraries.
Finally, the speed of decoding tagged pointers is influenced by
micro-architectural properties.
5.1 C pointer operations
The presence of metadata tags in pointers means that, without addi-
tional measures, the integer comparisons and arithmetic operations
may no longer accurately implement the semantics defined by the
C standard [21]. Moreover, while the C standard generally attempts
to leave data representation to be defined by the implementation, in
practice many C programs make assumptions that go much further
than the guarantees provided by the standard [7].
Additional instrumentation, in particular targeted removal of
pointer tags, is required to achieve compatibility of arbitrary pointer
tags with existing programs. Without this instrumentation, a pro-
gram would make different computations or control flow deci-
sions based on tagged pointers rather than regular ones. This can
cause the program to crash or produce incorrect results. The prob-
lem only arises, however, when tags encode per-pointer metadata.
This means that two pointers pointing to different locations in the
same memory object may have different tags, causing operation
semantics to change. Solutions using per-object metadata, such as
SGXBounds [26], do not experience this problem, since they do not
modify pointer tags after object allocation.
Pointer comparison. In the C standard, the outcome of compar-
ison operators on pointers is only defined if the pointers either
point to the same object or are part of the same aggregate object.
Although other cases are explicitly left undefined, the standard does
state in general that łthe result depends on the relative locations in
the address space of the objects pointed tož. In practice, however,
programs often assume that pointers are implemented as simple
integers and expect a total order on them, for instance for sorting.
When tagging pointers, this assumption no longer typically
holds, especially for dynamic tags. Tags should thus be masked
away before comparing pointers to avoid an incorrect result. For
Delta Pointers we mask away the tag including the overflow bit.
This is safe, since the masked pointers are only used for comparison
and never dereferenced, so no buffer overflow checks are needed.
Pointer subtraction. The C standard allows subtraction of point-
ers to the same array object. These are used to compute distances
between objects in the address space. While normally implemented
as an integer subtraction instruction, this may yield incorrect re-
sults in the presence of different pointer tags. The tags of subtracted
pointers must therefore be masked away. Some programs even sub-
tract pointers to different objects, thus violating the standard and
making assumptions on the memory layout. However, these ap-
plications are still supported when tags are removed. Note that
arithmetic optimizations by compilers may rewrite complex ex-
pressions involving pointers in such a way that these cases are
introduced as well, as also discussed below. All these scenarios are
supported by our Delta Pointers implementation.
Pointer alignment. Non-conforming programs often use bitwise
operations on pointers to detect or enforce alignment properties.
Such alignment works correctly for Delta Pointers without any
additional instrumentation, since it can only round pointers down,
increasing the distance to the end of the object. This will not lead to
false positives since applications themselves must assume that the
pointer remained unchanged and thus did not increase the distance
to the end of the object (which is what Delta Pointers enforce).
5.2 Compiler support
Pointer tagging requires type information to be able to distinguish
pointers, which, in turn, requires the defense to be implemented at
the compiler level. Code instrumentation can be done at different
compilation stages, in particular before and after optimizations.
Instrumenting before optimizations is easier because then the code
has not been transformed to patterns that hinder static analysis.
Instrumenting all pointer values, however, severely handicaps opti-
mizations: the instrumentation casts pointers to integers in order
to add, modify, or remove the tag, breaking alias analysis. Hence,
in order to attain high performance, pointer tagging must be ap-
plied after optimizations. This raises several issues that need to be
addressed by pointer tagging implementations. When left unad-
dressed, these issues can either cause the instrumentation passes
to fail due to unexpected inputs, or have them produce inaccurate
instrumentation code that corrupts the program state at runtime.
To the best of our knowledge, our Delta Pointers implementation
is the first to provide wide compatibility with complex source code
(e.g., SPEC CPU2006) due to the solutions described below.
Pointers as integers. Modern compilers such as LLVM implement
optimizations that produce arbitrary typecasts from pointers to
integer types. Hence, static analysis is needed to determine which
values are pointers in optimized IR. For dereferencing operations,
the problem does not occur because the pointer value must al-
ways be cast to a pointer type prior to dereference. Comparison,
however, is defined on both integers and pointers, and subtraction
only on integers. Therefore, a pointer value that has an integer
type need not be typecast prior to these operations, making it un-
clear whether masking is needed. This problem can be solved using
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use-def chains [30] to trace back the origin of the pointer to its
definition (an allocation or function parameter) or a load frommem-
ory. Definitions contain the original variable type, which can be
used directly to determine if the value is a pointer. Pointer loads
from memory, however, can be transformed arbitrarily to integer
loads by optimizations. If the loaded pointer is never dereferenced,
the use-def chain does not provide information on its actual type,
and the value is not masked, producing incorrect behaviour. The
following example illustrates such a case:
int **a = ...; // uint64_t *a;
int **b = ...; // uint64_t *b;
diff = *b - *a; // diff = *b - *a;
The pointers pointed to by a and b are never dereferenced, their
values are only subtracted and the result is stored in memory. This
allows the compiler to remove the (implicit) type casts of *a and
*b to integers, effectively producing the code on the right, which
alters the type information of the values in memory.
This problem can be partially solved in two ways. First, metadata
describing the types can be added to values being loaded/stored
before running optimizations. Certain optimizations, such as type-
based alias analysis (TBAA) [10] already add such information,
which can be reused. However, such metadata can potentially be
removed by subsequent optimizations, and might thus not be com-
plete. The second solution is to trace back the pointee type through
the use-def chain of the address that is loaded, using nested type
inspection to find a pointer type. This on itself works reasonably
well since the folding of memory loads and type casts is often very
localized, requiring only limited backtracing of the use-def chain to
find the original pointer type. Our Delta Pointers implementation
uses a combination of these solutions, which our experiments show
is complete for all the tested programs.
Unions and pointer expressions. A union value of a pointer and
an integer may produce a typecast from a pointer to integer. The
operation can either be operating on the integer value or it can be
operating on the pointer value but preceded by a typecast because
the operation happens to only be defined on integers. For example,
bitwise operations are only defined on integers but are also used for
pointer alignment. Furthermore, compilers transform expressions
involving pointers in ways that sometimes produce unexpected
pointer operations. For example, consider (b − a) × 4 where a and b
are pointers. This should be caught as a regular pointer subtraction
as per Section 5.1, but the compiler may transform this to b × 4 +
a × −4, thus introducing pointer multiplication and then addition.
We observed similar cases in SPEC CPU2006 involving division,
remainder, bit shifts, bitwise OR, and bitwise XOR, all on pointer
operands. The case above is easily solved by masking the pointer
operands of multiplications, but the tag must be preserved when
the result is a pointer that may later be dereferenced in order to
do a bound check. In other words, the decision whether to mask
the pointer operand of an arithmetic expression thus depends on
whether the resulting expression is indeed used as a pointer (i.e., it
is dereferenced). This is determined by traversing its def-use chain
until such a use is encountered.
Although the combination of the above solutions theoretically
does not cover all code patterns expressible in compiler IR, it works
very well in practice. For instance, our Delta Pointers implementa-
tion correctly identifies all pointers in the C/C++ SPEC CPU2006
benchmark suite after full-fledged optimizations. Our design sig-
nificantly improves compatibility with respect to state-of-the-art
pointer tagging implementations such as SGXBounds [26], which
forcibly omits 6 out of 19 SPEC benchmarks due to incorrect pointer
identification.
5.3 Coverage considerations
Many pointer tagging applications assume that each dereferenced
pointer is tagged with metadata. For example, SGXBounds stores a
pointer in the tag that is dereferenced to retrieve further metadata.
When a pointer misses metadata, a NULL pointer is dereferenced
and the program crashes. However, reaching complete coverage
is not always possible or even desired. For instance, optimizations
by the defense may omit instrumentation on pointers that only
have safe uses. When these pointers are used at the same site as
unsafe pointers, the instrumentation at that site cannot assume the
presence of metadata in the pointer. Furthermore, uninstrumented
libraries may generate untagged pointers, and cannot handle tagged
pointers passed in library call parameters.
A robust pointer tagging-based defense should therefore be de-
signed to deal with missing metadata. Unfortunately, most existing
defenses require extra branches to deal with missing metadata. Al-
ternatively, and even less desirably, such defenses must instrument
all libraries and disable aggressive optimizations. In contrast, Delta
Pointers are robust by design against missing metadata because the
zeroed metadata is not dereferenced as a pointer. It effectively treats
missing metadata as a very large distance to the end of the object,
larger than the object can possibly be, therefore simply disabling
the bound check in a situation where metadata is missing (which is
the expected behavior).
Uninstrumented libraries are, in fact, part of a general prob-
lem with pointer tagging: there is always a protection boundary
at which marshalling must occur between tagged and untagged
pointers. Even if all libraries are statically linked and instrumented,
the boundary is only moved to system calls that cannot operate on
tagged pointers (unless even the OS kernel is rewritten). Ideally,
pointers handled by the protected application are always tagged
and pointers outside the boundary are not. In other words, the
storage of pointers can not be shared between protected and unpro-
tected code. A complex example is std::list::push_back in an
uninstrumented libstdc++. The implementation of this function
is defined in a header file and therefore resides in the protected
executable. It calls a library function that takes a generic node type
for doubly linked lists as a parameter. This data structure is created
in push_back, which is instrumented because it resides in the pro-
tected executable, and thus tags the node’s next and prev pointers
with metadata. Code inside libstdc++ does not mask the pointers
before dereferencing and crashes if these pointers are tagged.
Defining a protection boundary requires a set of rules that specify
when to add or remove tags to pointers. Rules for removing tags are
mostly universal, but rules for adding tags depend on the specific
defense being implemented.
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5.4 Performance considerations
The minimum instrumentation required to implement pointer tag-
ging consists of tagging and masking. These are bitwise operations
that are fast in modern, pipelined processors. However, they may
still have an effect on the pipeline and increase register pressure
when the masking constant does not fit in an immediate operand
(as is the case for 64-bit masks on x86-64). For this reason, recent
hardware designs are shipping with built-in support forMMU-based
masking: AArch64 supports virtual address tagging [2] which intro-
duces a top byte ignore option for the hardware to ignore the upper
16 pointer bits during dereference, specifically for the purpose of
encoding metadata. Oracle’s SPARC-M7 architecture [35] can even
ignore up to 32 bits of metadata. This completely eliminates the
need for software-based masking and paves the way for highly
efficient encoding of per-pointer metadata. In other cases, efficient
masking can be done with fewer restrictions on the bitmask width
than on x86-64. For instance, ARM64’s AND instructions support
efficient variable-length encoding of certain 64-bit immediates, in-
cluding the bitmask required by Delta Pointers.
Another performance consideration of pointer tagging solutions
is protection against metadata corruption. Arithmetic on a pointer
may overflow into the metadata bits, allowing an attacker to bypass
the implemented defense. SGXBounds experiences this problem,
and thus needs to move the metadata out of a pointer before every
pointer arithmetic instruction and move it back in afterwards, in-
curring significant additional overhead. Delta Pointers do not need
special treatment here: a pointer overflow will also overflow the
delta tag into the overflow bit, correctly invalidating the pointer.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of Delta Pointers for Linux on
the x86-64 architecture on top of the LLVM compiler infrastructure
[27] (version 3.8). The code consists of 3,749 SLOC of LLVM C++
passes, which add the instrumentation described in Sections 4 and 5.
An additional 846 SLOC make up runtime and helper libraries,
including a static library that shrinks the address space of the
process to make room for tags in pointers. The code is open source.2
In order to harden an existing program with Delta Pointers, the
programmer adds compiler flags that invoke our passes during the
compilation of source into the binary, and during linking to link
in our static library. The resulting binary is then run through a
post-processing script to shrink its address space. The resulting
binary can then run as-is, raising an error upon detection of an out-
of-bounds memory access. Dereferences of out-of-bounds pointers
will cause the MMU to trigger a general protection or stack segment
fault, which Linux will deliver to our process as a segmentation
fault or bus error. We install a signal handler to distinguish such
cases and report an appropriate error.
6.1 Address space reduction
User-space pointers in Linux are 47 bits. We limit this to 32 bits to
support 32-bit tags. Only changing the allocator is not sufficient
for this purpose, as the kernel maps the stack and loader at high
memory addresses. The loader itself will also run code performing
allocations before we get a chance to insert code. A kernel patch is
2https://github.com/vusec/deltapointers
the most straightforward way to limit the address space for map-
pings, but provides poor portability. Instead, we use the approach
of Mid-Fat Pointers [25] to limit the address space in user mode:
First, we prelink the binary, loader, and any shared libraries used
by the program at locations that fit 32 bits. Then, during program
startup, we move the stack and thread-local storage down in the
address space. Finally, we reserve the memory area above 32-bit
with an anonymous non-reserved mapping to avoid subsequent
allocations in this address range.
6.2 Instrumentation
Listing 1 in Section 4 describes the instrumentation added by our
LLVM passes. We apply these changes after optimizations, includ-
ing link-time optimization (LTO), so that these optimizations are
not hindered by our inserted pointer-to-integer casts. A final opti-
mization pass performs optimizations such as constant folding on
the added instrumentation.
For dereferencing instructions, we consider LLVM’s load and
store instructions and memory intrinsics (which cover calls to the
memcpy family). For memory intrinsics, we update the pointer tag
with the size of the dereferenced memory range minus one so that
the highest dereferenced pointer is checked. The size is truncated
to the maximum object size of 31 bits to also check very large sizes
caused by implicit casts from signed to unsigned integers.
6.3 Coverage
Finding all heap allocations. Detecting overflows for all buffers
requires identification of all memory allocations so that the re-
sulting pointers can be tagged. Stack allocations and globals are
trivially identified by their unique representation in LLVM, but
heap allocations are performed by calls to memory allocator func-
tions. We currently support all allocation functions in the C and
C++ standard libraries. Custom allocators that preallocate a pool
of memory using malloc or mmap, however, must expose alloca-
tion function names and the position of their size arguments to
the Delta Pointers implementation in order to support per-object
buffer overflow detection (otherwise only per-pool overflows can
be detected). This is the case for nginx which we support by adding
its custom pool allocation functions to our predefined list.
Pointer marshalling at library calls. As explained in Section 5.3,
making sure that all pointers in the protected executable have a tag
requires a set of rules that define how pointers tags are added and
removed at the protection boundary. For Delta Pointers, we have
opted to place this boundary at the level of dynamic library calls
in order to provide portability and maintainability, preserving the
ability to update libraries without having to recompile all protected
programs that use these libraries.
Pointers passed as parameters to library calls are masked in the
same way as dereferencing operations, so the overflow bit is left in-
tact. This design even prevents an attacker from using a vulnerable
library function to dereference an already out-of-bounds pointer
(however does not protect against out-of-bounds dereferences if
the library code adds an offset to the pointer). Nested pointers in
data structures, such as those used in std::list::push_back, are
stripped of metadata when a pointer to the data structure is passed
to a library function. The tags are not restored after the function
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call, so these pointers remain unprotected inside the protected ex-
ecutable as well, thus assuming that the library implementations
handling the data structures are safe. No tag is added back to the
pointer, since it is not known how the function alters pointers in
the data structure. Although this introduces untagged pointers in
the protected executable, all functions that operate on the data
structure are in fact implementations of standard library functions
in header files. These functions are in fact outside the protection
boundary, only included in the executable for optimization reasons
(inlining). The only other case requiring similar instrumentation is
std::string::operator+=.
Finally, data pointers returned by library functions are tagged
to offer protection inside the executable. In particular, the rules
specify how the distance from the returned pointer to the end of
the referent object can be inferred from the call parameters. We
have analyzed all functions in the C and C++ standard libraries and
identified six categories:
• copy: Copy the tag of an argument. E.g., strdup.
• diff: rettaд = paramtaд+(retaddress −paramaddress ). E.g.,
strchr.
• static: Tag is constant, size inferred from return type. E.g.,
fopen.
• strlen: rettaд = strlen(retaddress ). E.g., getenv.
• strtok: Special case for strtok: replace its implementation
with a version that maintains the current end-of-object dis-
tance in a global variable.
• noarith: Disallow pointer arithmetic by assuming an object
size of 1 byte. This is used for opaque return types such as
that of opendir, whose returned pointer is not dereferenced
inside the executable itself but only passed as a parameter
to library calls.
Using these categories, we are able to instrument 99.7% of all
dereferenced pointers in SPEC CPU2006. The remaining 0.3% are
all related to shared state between protected code and unprotected
library code. We verified through manual inspection that these
cases can either be fixed with static analysis (e.g., argv) or can
safely be ignored. An example of the latter case are C++ VTables
which contain code pointers to virtual methods of objects. Each
object stores an object to its VTable, which if instrumented cannot
be dereferenced by libraries. The table structure is, however, an
implementation detail of the compiler and not transparent to the
programmer. All accesses to VTables are compiler-generated and
can therefore be assumed to be in bounds (not accounting for com-
piler or type-confusion bugs). Our Delta Pointers implementation
therefore omits tags on VTable pointers in favor of compatibil-
ity. Note that no checks need to be inserted on pointers without
metadata, which Delta Pointers support by design.
6.4 Optimization
Some existing bounds checkers implement analyses that identify
safe memory accesses, which are statically known to be in-bounds.
Unfortunately, these optimizations are not directly applicable to
Delta Pointers, because the bounds checks are implicitly performed
at pointer arithmetic sites. Masking instrumentation can only be
removed from a memory access if none of the possible pointer
values can have a tag, meaning that any instrumentation that adds
or modifies the tag must first be removed. This is not always safe
to do, for example when the same allocation is also passed to a
function that does a possibly out-of-bounds memory access.
We use static analysis to find allocations, propagation sites (pointer
arithmetic) and masking sites (loads/stores) that do not need instru-
mentation. In particular, we use LLVM’s scalar evolution (SCEV)
analysis [13] to trace back pointer bounds from loads and stores
and omit instrumentation where the pointer can be proven to be in
bounds. The analysis records the distances to the object start and
end (0, size) at each allocation site. These bounds are then propa-
gated over the def-use chain of the allocation. At a propagation site,
the offset is added to the recorded start distance and subtracted
from the end distance. At a load or store, the recorded distances
are used in combination with the dereferenced number of bytes to
check if the dereferenced pointer is in bounds. Instrumentation is
omitted on pointers produced by allocations or propagation sites
that are only dereferenced in bounds. Masks are also omitted from
dereferenced pointers that do not contain a tag because of optimiza-
tions. Note that since we use SCEV analysis, which represents IR
operations as expressions, both size and pointer offsets need not
be constants, thus allowing for aggressive optimizations.
Another optimization we perform is the hoisting of bounds
checks out of loops. Consider a simple loop that requires a bounds
check in each iteration:
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
buf[i] = `x';
It is easy to see that this check only needs to be performed once on
buf[9]. We use the same SCEV analysis as described above to infer
the maximum value at compile time and insert a dummy load before
the loop to trigger a fault if the computed offset is out-of-bounds.
Instrumentation on the operations inside the loop is removed. This
optimization can only be performed if the pointer &buf[i] does
not escape the loop body. Unfortunately, LLVM rewrites the exit
condition in the above loop to i == 10, thus making &buf[10]
the maximum value of the pointer inferred by SCEV. Although the
pointer has this value after the loop, it is never actually dereferenced.
We have implemented a simple pattern detection to support this
case, but the problem still exists for complex loops found in real-
world programs such as in the SPEC benchmarks. We consider this
a limitation of the SCEV implementation and therefore out of scope
for this work.
7 EVALUATION
To evaluate Delta Pointers we look at both their performance and
security. To study the performance we benchmark SPEC CPU2006
and other real-world applications. We then evaluate the effective-
ness of Delta Pointers by determining if they mitigate a number of
recent CVEs reported by related work.
7.1 Runtime performance
We have evaluated Delta Pointers on the C and C++ programs of
the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarking suite [19]. This suite contains
a wide variety of complex real-world programs, including a Perl
interpreter, XML parser and simulations. Additionally, we evalu-
ated Delta Pointers on Nginx 1.10.2. We used Intel Xeon E5-2630v3
machines with 16 cores at 2.40 GHz and 64 GB of memory, running
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Figure 4: Runtime overhead of SPEC CPU2006 for our Delta
Pointers prototype.
64-bit CentOS 7.2.1511. Each overhead number is the median of 16
iterations of the same program (using the reference workset for
SPEC), and we manually verified standard deviations to be negligi-
ble. For the baseline, we enabled link-time optimizations. Two of
the 19 benchmarks are not compatible out-of-the-box with Delta
Pointers: 403.gcc uses upper pointer bits of pointers larger than 32
bits for page ordering, and corrupts a pointer tag by using NULL
pointer subtraction and addition instead of a regular typecasts for
type conversion between pointers and integers. 450.soplex is incom-
patible with per-pointer bounds checkers: it patches pointers to
point to out-of-bounds locations using pointer subtraction after
reallocating a buffer containing pointers. This violation of the C
standard is well-documented in related work [26, 34], and other
researchers either patch or omit these programs as well. In order to
avoid the impact of omitting benchmarks on the overall overhead,
we wrote small source patches for 403.gcc to configure pointer bit-
size at 32 bits and to preserve a pointer tag at a single NULL pointer
subtraction, and for 450.soplex to fix the delta tag on patched point-
ers after realloc. The evaluation numbers thus include the entire
C/C++ subset of SPEC CPU2006 (19 benchmarks in total).
We have benchmarked Delta Pointers both with and without
the optimizations from Section 6.4. Figure 4 shows the measured
runtime overhead for these configurations (raw runtimes are avail-
able at the end of the paper). In all cases, Delta Pointers show
a negligible memory overhead. The instrumentation causes 41%
geometric mean (geomean) runtime overhead, which is reduced
to 35% by optimizations. In comparison, our implementation of
using branches for upper-bound checks (which is equivalent to
SGXBounds without underflow checks) achieves 48%, confirming
that bitwise and arithmetic instrumentation is significantly faster
than using branches. The instrumented binaries are on average 80%
bigger, both in terms of instructions and file size.
To accurately compare these results with related work, we tried
to reproduce competing results on the same setup in order to com-
pare to the same efficient baseline on modern hardware. We evalu-
ated SGXBounds on our setup and obtained 94% geomean overhead























Figure 5: Runtime overhead of SPEC CPU2006 for different
components of Delta Pointers instrumentation (with opti-
mizations disabled).
which is much higher than the 55% reported in the paper. After
consistently seeing these results across machines, we contacted the
authors but together we were not able to determine the root cause
of this difference. The authors of Low-Fat Pointers were unable to
share their prototype due to it being in an alpha state, and Baggy
Bounds [1] is closed-source. We could easily evaluate AddressSan-
itizer because it is part of LLVM. The run times obtained on our
experimental setup are available at the end of the paper.
Overall, we can see that our overflow detection design is far
more efficient than ASan, which has 80% overhead. We only have
slightly lower compatibility: we require small source patches for
two SPEC 2006 benchmarks whereas ASan requires this for one
benchmark. ASan also has a large memory overhead, whereas Delta
Pointers have negligible memory overhead. Also note that ASan
has weaker spatial detection guarantees, since it can only detect
contiguous overflows. On the subset of SPEC 2006 benchmarks
supported by SGXBounds, Delta Pointers have a 35% overall over-
head, compared to the 94% of SGXBounds, while achieving higher
compatibility (SGXBounds cannot run 6 benchmarks because it
does not deal with some issues described in Section 5). Low-Fat
Pointers does not support 4 out of the 19 SPEC benchmarks, but
can be benchmarked using manual source fixes. The paper reports
52% overhead versus 35% for Delta Pointers. In addition, Low-Fat
does not cover globals or the NULL pointer and provides lower
compatibility overall.
To gain insight in the origin of the measured overhead, we have
independently measured the overheads of different instrumenta-
tion components (with optimizations disabled). The results are in
Figure 5. We observe that the overhead of masking at every pointer
dereference is geomean 20%. This is perhaps higher than expected
since the operations are bitwise ANDs which are expected to be
fast. But the performance impact of register pinning and pipeline
stalls, as described in Section 5.4, evidently proves non-trivial and
likely requires hardware optimizations to further reduce the over-
head. Tagging all allocations with delta tags is cheap, adding only






















Figure 6: Overhead of Nginx web server for Delta Pointers.
2 percent point overhead. This is expected, since allocations typi-
cally happen outside of the main computation loops. Finally, like
masking, instrumentation on pointer arithmetic is higher than ex-
pected at 19 percent point, making the overall overhead 41%. We
have investigated the assembly generated for our instrumentation
by the compiler and concluded that the instrumentation hinders
optimizations made by the LLVM x86-64 backend. In particular, the
instruction selection chooses to emit separate addition and multi-
plication instructions for pointer offset computations rather than
using efficient scaling-based addressing mode as supported by lea
and mov. This is especially the case for dynamic offsets that cannot
be constant-folded. Unfortunately, dynamic offsets are prevalent in
SPEC: we found that 72% of all pointer arithmetic instructions in the
reported benchmarks use dynamic offsets. Thus, although our cur-
rent overhead is already competitive, (admittedly non-trivialÐdue
to the LLVM architecture) optimizations of the instrumentation of
dynamic pointer arithmetic in the compiler backend may improve
the results even more.
We have also tested Delta Pointers on the Nginx web server. The
performance of Nginx primarily depends on I/O, and Nginx does
relatively few pointer operations. Because of this we observed negli-
gible effects on performance, as shown in Figure 6. Our benchmarks
were performed requesting 64 byte pages with 8 workers over a
54 Gbit/s link. On average we observe a 4% increase in latency, with
a maximum of 6% for the unsaturated case going down to 3% when
saturation is reached. When the server is saturated we observe only
a 2% drop in throughput for Delta Pointers.
7.2 Security
We have evaluated the effectiveness of Delta Pointers by exam-
ining a number of recent common vulnerabilities and exposures
(CVEs) [8]. To be able to compare to previous work, we have ex-
amined all CVEs reported in recent work [12, 26]: 8 CVEs across
6 popular programs, including Heartbleed in OpenSSL and bugs
in Nginx and PHP. Rather than only checking if existing exploits
are circumvented, we used manual analysis to determine if the
exploitability of an attack is affected.
As detailed below, Delta Pointers completely prevent 7 of the
8 analyzed attacks, with the uncaught bug only supported by a
single existing bounds checker, demonstrating that Delta Point-
ers offer practical security guarantees. The undetected bug is not
fundamental to the design of Delta Pointers, but is outside the pro-
tection boundary of our implementation. Adding support for the
bug is trivial (a single line of code) by treating recv as a memory
intrinsic. This could be done for all standard C library functions, as
done by SGXBounds, to extend protection to outside the protection
boundary.
CVE-2011-4971 in MemCached 1.4.15. A signed integer is set to a
negative value by the attacker, and passed as a large unsigned size
to memcpy. Our instrumentation on memory intrinsics covers this
case, preventing out-of-bounds reads.
CVE-2013-2028 in Nginx 1.4.0. An attacker-controlled negative
signed integer is passed as a large unsigned size to recv which
copies data into a limited-size buffer. Delta Pointers cannot not
detect this case since the write resides in an uninstrumented libc
function. To cover this vulnerability, functions like recv could be
encapsulated in wrappers that implement checks on the underlying
memory accesses. Note that this requires manual analysis of the
semantics of all library functions that access memory buffers based
on parameter values which is only done by SGXBounds, so the bug
is not covered automatically by any other existing defense.
CVE-2014-0160 in OpenSSL 1.0.1f (Heartbleed). A 2-byte attacker
controlled response length is used to transmit back a buffer of an
attacker-controlled size, allowing the attacker to leak up to 64KB
of memory, including private keys. The buffer pointer is correctly
tagged and the overread is detected successfully.
CVE-2016-1234 in glibc-2.19. While glibc is not compatible with
LLVM out-of-the-box, we still analyze this CVE to compare effec-
tiveness of our design to that of Low-Fat Pointers which reports
it. The bug is a stack buffer overflow due to an access with the
length of a directory name as offset, which can be up to 510 bytes
larger than the buffer size on for instance the NTFS file system. Our
Delta Pointers design would correctly tag the allocated buffer and
prevent the attack.
CVE-2016-2554 in PHP-5.5.31. A string inside struct _tar_header
is assumed to be null-terminated but can be attacker controller. By
crafting a struct without any null-bytes this intra-struct overflow
can be extended far beyond the size of the struct. This finally ends
up in a strncpy with the overflowed size of the struct, which Delta
Pointers detect because of our strncpy instrumentation.
CVE-2016-3191 in PCRE2-10.20. An attacker-controlled regex can
cause a contiguous overflow on a stack buffer, as the (*ACCEPT)
verb will write a closing parenthesis for any currently open paren-
thesis, without checking for the presence of such closing paren-
thesis nor whether there is space in the buffer. Our Delta Pointers
design easily detects this case.
CVE-2016-6289 in PHP-7.0.3. Similar to CVE-2011-4971 a signed
integer is passed to a memcpy call. Our Delta Pointers implementa-
tion instruments the intrinsic and detects any overflow.
CVE-2016-6297 in PHP-7.0.3. An attacker can supply a large string
triggering an integer overflow in strlen. The resulting length is
then passed to memcpy where it is cast to a size_t similar to CVE-
2011-4971, which is detected.
SPEC CPU2006. We have also confirmed a number of benign
buffer overflows in SPEC CPU2006 which are reported by related
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work [26, 37]. perlbench contains a benign buffer overread in
a memcmp call, which is caught by Delta Pointers because of our
intrinsic handling. h264ref contains two bugs: one involving a
global variable and one on the stack. The stack-based overflow is
entirely optimized away by LLVM during vectorization (as LLVM
can statically determine there is undefined behavior). If we disable
these optimizations, Delta Pointers detect the bug. The bug where
a global variable is overflown is also detected by Delta Pointers, in
contrast to, for instance, Low-Fat Pointers. For the performance
evaluation of Delta Pointers, we fixed these bugs using the source
patch from AddressSanitizer.
8 DISCUSSION
Bounds narrowing. Our prototype does currently not support
bounds narrowing, where bounds of sub-objects in composite types
are enforced (e.g., an array in a struct). Since our Delta Pointers
design records per-pointer metadata, such a feature could easily
be added. Such strict enforcement of bounds is knows to cause
compatibility problems [7, 34].
Integer overflow on pointers. Most processor architectures imple-
ment arithmetic overflow on regular integer additions: when all
bits in an integer are set and 1 is added, the number wraps around
to zero. In our pointer encoding scheme, an attacker may be able to
clear the overflow bit by adding a very large offset that causes such
an overflow. This can normally be mitigated by simply limiting
offsets to 32 bits (which is already normally the case in real-world
programs), but, in some cases, the attacker might be able to use a
pointer addition inside a loop to iteratively overflow the pointer.
Thus, in order to provide complete protection on the upper bound,
Delta Pointers require an upper bound on the result of pointer ad-
ditions. This is called saturation arithmetic. Saturating operations
clamp their results to a given minimum and maximum, typically
with all-zero and all-one bits respectively.
Some architectures have dedicated instructions for saturation
arithmetic. For instance, ARM offers the UQADD instruction to per-
form saturating addition on 64-bit unsigned integers, which consti-
tute our use case. Intel x86-64, however, only supports 8/16-bit satu-
ration through PADDUSB/PADDUSW. 64-bit saturation on x86-64 is most
efficiently performed by conditional (but non-branching) instruc-
tions (CMOVcc) which replace the result of an addition based on the
value of the FLAGS register. To support saturation arithmetic, Delta
Pointers could optionally use conditional instructions to replace the
result of pointer arithmetic with the maximum integer value. Such
instructions are reasonably fast since they operate only on registers,
but they must be inserted on all pointer arithmetic, hence resulting
in higher overhead. For our Delta Pointers prototype, we felt this
was not a feature to prioritize given the additional performance cost
and limited security improvement. Namely, the feature is only nec-
essary if an attacker can add an offset of (1 << 31) + object_size
bits to a pointer, either at once or iteratively, without dereferencing
it in the meantime (since the intermediate pointers are detected as
out-of-bounds). This is rarely an option in practice, since a pointer
computed inside a loop is usually dereferenced inside the loop, and
otherwise hoisted out of the loop by compiler optimizations. We
have manually confirmed this for all the vulnerabilities analyzed in
Section 7, for which saturation arithmetic would thus not provide
any security improvement.
Unaligned access. When a pointer is cast to an arbitrary type and
dereferenced, the number of dereferenced bytes may differ from
the allocated pointer type. Delta Pointers do not support detection
of such unaligned accesses, since the situation only arises in the
context of a type confusion bug which is not in our threat model.
For intellectual curiosity, we have, however, implemented optional
support for unaligned access detection in the form of an additional
pointer arithmetic that adds the dereferenced number of bytes
minus one to the delta tag before each dereferencing instruction.
This adds 3% overhead on SPEC 2006.
Delta tag compression. Delta tags take up half the pointer in
the current design of Delta Pointers, severely limiting the address
space (and thus ASLR entropy) in return for strong memory safety
guarantees. Reducing the number of bits needed for the delta tag
could alleviate this trade-off, as done in similar schemes. For exam-
ple, Baggy Bounds [1] compresses object size tags in pointers by
allocating power-of-two sized objects, storing only the exponent.
Compression for Delta Pointers is not trivial since the delta tag
stores the distance to the end of the object rather than the object
size. At first sight it might seem possible to compress this by align-
ing all objects and their size to a number of compression bits (n).
However, this naive scheme breaks when a pointer is unaligned
with respect to its compression. For example, if we align all objects
to 8 bytes (n = 3), we store 3 fewer bits in the tag. This makes it
impossible to update the tag with offsets smaller than 8 bytes, e.g.,
p=(char*)malloc(N)+1. When done iteratively, 8 such pointer
additions would overflow the object without being detected.
Arbitrary compression is possible by adding additional arith-
metic operations to each pointer modification. The intuition is that,
when aligning all objects to n bits, the lower n bits of the delta tag
and the address contain the same information. Thus, we can store
this information in only the address itself, enabling compression of
the tag. Any addition smaller than 2n only occurs on the address,
but if it carries into the (n + 1)th address bit we continue the addi-
tion on the delta tag. The remainder (the part of the offset that is
a multiple of 2n ) is added directly to the tag. The following code
shows how this is done using bitwise operators, when adding offset
a to a pointer while using n compression bits:
carry = (( ptr_old ^ ptr_new ^ a) >> n) & 1
tag_new = tag_old + (a >> n) + carry
The first line determines whether the lower n bits of the address
carried into the next bit, and the second line replicates the carry
on the tag. This scheme offers a larger address space, but incurs
memory overhead due to alignment, and runtime overhead due to
the additional instrumentation required.
Backend optimization. Section 7 details the performance hit of
pointer arithmetic instrumentation on x86-64. Future work could
feature an optimization of the LLVM backend that allows for effi-
cient code generation of instrumented pointer arithmetic, better
utilizing the scaling-based addressing mode of x86-64 instructions.
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Table 1: Comparison of overflow checkers. Most evalua-
tions use (nonoverlapping) sets of benchmarks, making the
overhead numbers difficult to compare. The table is catego-
rized by benchmarks used, using a random set of CPU ’95,
’00, ’06 and Olden, CPU2000 and CPU2006 respectively. The
















































Softbound ✗ Table Deref ✓ ✓ 67% 64%
Baggy Bounds ✗ Layout Arith ✓a ✓ 72% 11%
PAriCheck ✗ Shadow Arith ✓ ✓b 96% 18%
LBC ✗ Shadow Deref ✓ ✗ 22% 7.7%
ASan ✓ Shadow Deref ✓ ✗ 80% 237%
Intel MPX ✓ Table Deref ✓ ✓ 139% 90%
LowFat ✓ Layout Deref ✗ ✓ 54% 5.2%
SGXBounds ✓ Tag Deref ✓ ✓ 89% 0.1%
Delta Pointers ✓ Tag Ð ✓ ✓ 35% 0%
a Only up to alloc_size/2 on 32-bit.
b Unless wrap-around on 16-bit labels occurs.
9 RELATED WORK
Overflow detection. There has been a plethora of research on
buffer overflow detection over the past decades. Table 1 present a
summary of the major systems. Early systems often relied on fat
pointers which had a high overhead and introduced many com-
patibility issues, often requiring programmers to change existing
code [4, 22, 32]. The system proposed by Jones and Kelly [23] in-
stead relied on external metadata, associated per-object. Since such
per-object designs retrieve pointer bounds by looking at the ob-
jects, they cannot support temporarily out-of-bound pointers, and
perform their checks during arithmetic. Later designs attempted to
fix these limitations [36] and performance issues [9].
The first practical design was that of Baggy Bounds [1], which
encodes metadata in the memory layout. Similarly to Delta Pointers,
Baggy Bounds also uses pointer tagging to store the size-class of
an object, and encodes encodes out-of-bound pointers as invalid
(non-canonical) to cause automatic hardware crashes. Instead of
masking pointers before every memory access, Baggy Bounds in-
stead places tags for valid pointers in the upper bits of the lower
48 bits, and creates aliased mappings for each tag. This way every
tagged pointer is still valid in the address space, with the limitation
that even fewer bits are available for both the tag and the pointer.
Low-Fat pointers [11, 12] takes the baggy bounds design and opti-
mizes it even more by grouping size-classes together in the address
space. By sacrificing compatibility of not supporting out-of-bound
pointers between contexts Low-Fat can achieve a higher perfor-
mance. Like any other bounds checker, the Delta Pointers design
supports out-of-bound pointers.
Instead of relying on per-object metadata, Delta Pointers rely
on per-pointer metadata. SoftBound [31] transforms the source to
keep track of the metadata for pointers, and stores them separately
whenever pointers leak to memory. Because of its limited static anal-
ysis, SoftBound suffers from a low compatibility. Intel MPX [34]
achieves a similar design with the support of hardware, introduced
with the Skylake microarchitecture but incurs high overhead.
SGXBounds [26] presents a design well geared towards the
current version of SGX, which has a limited address space. It en-
codes the upper bound inside the pointers, with a design based on
Boundless [6]. Boundless stores distance information similar to
Delta Pointers, but only to ultimately compute the upper bound
as used by SGXBounds. These systems thus still require branches,
and rely on memory accesses to record lower bounds. SGXBounds
suffers from a low compatibility due to its limited static analysis, a
problem which Delta Pointers address. Delta Pointers could also
work well inside SGX enclaves. Outside of enclaves SGXBounds is
shown to suffer from much higher overheads.
Some alternative designs do not record the bounds information
itself. PAriCheck [38] instead tags every few bytes with a label,
and during pointer arithmetic enforces that every pointer points
to memory with the same tag. Sadly such a design suffers from
impractical high overheads. LBC [18] and AddressSanitizer [37]
instead place guard zones around every object, and verify every
memory access is outside of a guard zone. Guard zones and their
metadata incur a large memory overhead, and moreover, can only
detect contiguous buffer overflows.
Pointer tagging. The concept of tagged pointers has been used for
decades, but generally concerns the lower bit(s) of a pointer [3, 14].
Baggy Bounds [1], Boundless [6], SGXBounds [26], andMid-Fat [25]
all store tags in the upper bits of pointers. Our design provides a
more comprehensive analysis increasing compatibility of pointer
tagging over these approaches. Hardware support for pointer tag-
ging can be found in recent architectures with ARMv8’s virtual
address tagging [2] and Oracle’s SPARC-M7 SSM/VA masking [35].
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented Delta Pointers, a design for a fast and
compatible buffer overflow detector. In contrast to existing solu-
tions, Delta Pointers do not rely on memory lookups nor branches,
yielding a competitive, low-overhead design with 35% performance
overhead and negligible memory overhead. Our design relies on
pointer tagging to maintain the distance from the current pointer
to the end of the object to implicitly invalidate overflowed pointers.
We hope our findings on pointer tagging will encourage future
research, and as such, our framework and Delta Pointers prototype
are available open source.
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OVERHEADS AND RAW RUNTIMES
Table 2: Normalized runtime overheads of SPEC CPU2006 for Delta Pointers, an imple-
mention using the pointer tagging framework on Delta Pointers but using branches for
upper bound checks (łBranches uboundž), and related work.
Components Delta Pointers Branches ubound Related work
Benchmark Lang. Mask Mask + tag No opts Opts No opts Opts ASan SGXBounds
400.perlbench C 1.47 1.51 1.83 1.62 3.34 1.97 4.01 -
401.bzip2 C 1.23 1.24 1.54 1.50 1.72 1.63 1.70 2.22
403.gcc C 1.14 1.16 1.24 1.23 1.47 1.34 2.23 -
429.mcf C 1.15 1.15 1.24 1.18 1.36 1.29 1.70 1.58
433.milc C 1.07 1.08 1.15 1.08 1.27 1.09 1.35 1.59
444.namd C++ 1.17 1.18 1.38 1.32 1.42 1.36 1.52 1.84
445.gobmk C 1.21 1.31 1.56 1.53 2.17 1.91 1.66 2.18
447.dealII C++ 1.17 1.18 1.40 1.32 1.56 1.32 2.26 -
450.soplex C++ 1.12 1.13 1.29 1.22 1.37 1.22 1.57 -
453.povray C++ 1.37 1.39 1.64 1.52 2.47 2.00 2.72 -
456.hmmer C 1.26 1.26 1.52 1.53 2.00 1.60 1.91 2.51
458.sjeng C 1.25 1.29 1.57 1.56 2.47 1.98 1.73 2.32
462.libquantum C 1.03 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.11 1.08 1.19
464.h264ref C 1.31 1.30 1.65 1.39 2.32 1.44 2.15 -
470.lbm C 1.03 1.03 1.38 1.44 1.21 1.19 1.01 1.63
471.omnetpp C++ 1.16 1.18 1.24 1.22 1.43 1.30 2.09 -
473.astar C++ 1.22 1.30 1.49 1.45 1.76 1.57 1.54 1.84
482.sphinx3 C 1.19 1.17 1.35 1.33 1.74 1.57 1.69 2.24
483.xalancbmk C++ 1.32 1.30 1.44 1.35 1.84 1.64 2.08 2.68
Geomean 1.20 1.22 1.41 1.35 1.72 1.48 1.80 -
Subset sgxbounds 1.17 1.19 1.38 1.35 1.63 1.47 1.55 1.94
Table 3: Raw runtimes of SPEC in seconds, corresponding to the overheads in Table 2. All numbers were
gathered on the DAS-5 cluster (https://www.cs.vu.nl/das5/), each number is the median of 16 runs. Note that
Delta Pointers and other overflow checkers each require a different build configuration and baseline.
Baselines Components Delta Pointers Branches ubound Related work
Benchmark LTO ASana SGXBoundsb Mask Mask + tag No opts Opts No opts Opts ASan SGXBounds
400.perlbench 262 282 - 386 396 480 424 878 518 1133 -
401.bzip2 440 432 438 542 545 678 662 758 719 736 974
403.gcc 255 259 - 291 296 317 313 374 342 577 -
429.mcf 228 227 227 262 262 283 270 310 295 387 359
433.milc 458 482 491 490 494 525 493 581 501 650 780
444.namd 331 328 328 388 392 457 438 471 451 498 604
445.gobmk 380 404 389 462 498 593 584 827 727 671 850
447.dealII 225 253 - 263 266 315 298 350 297 572 -
450.soplex 197 195 - 220 222 254 239 270 240 306 -
453.povray 118 130 - 163 164 194 180 293 236 356 -
456.hmmer 380 382 385 478 479 577 582 762 610 731 966
458.sjeng 417 427 413 520 536 655 650 1032 828 737 957
462.libquantum 336 339 343 347 358 366 368 375 374 367 409
464.h264ref 468 481 - 612 610 774 651 1085 674 1034 -
470.lbm 353 354 339 362 365 487 509 427 421 357 551
471.omnetpp 280 291 - 326 331 348 342 400 365 607 -
473.astar 319 351 343 388 416 474 463 561 500 542 630
482.sphinx3 453 428 446 540 529 614 604 787 712 724 1001
483.xalancbmk 171 184 179 225 223 246 230 314 280 383 480
a No LTO, since ASan does not support LTO on all benchmarks.
b Linked against musl, no LTO but all bitcode is combined in a single module with O3, libc++ inlined as bitcode.
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